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preparing speeches for National Party Congresses or for ple-
nary sessions of the Central Committee.
What are the channels of communication and influence that
the think tanks use? The writer identifies many different av-
enues of communication between the institutions and the de-
cision-makers, beginning with studies commissioned by the
leaders, sometimes even on a commercial basis. The reports
may deal with cross-disciplinary subjects such as macroeco-
nomic regulation or social security, or more specialised ques-
tions arising within specific fields of competence; sometimes
the experts are required to work directly with state-owned
companies to support the implementation of a policy initia-
tive. Most projects extend over a certain period, especially
the preparatory research for five-year plans undertaken by
the NRDC’s research bodies. Others may be shorter or
even emergency operations, as was the case during the
Asian financial crisis or in the wake of 9/11. 
The specialists may also exert their influence through the “in-
ternal” publications available to them. Their contributions are
not necessarily commissioned by the authorities but are often
read by senior officials, who may subsequently choose to fol-
low up with personal meetings with the experts. Similarly,
Ma reports that an official or his secretary may sometimes
keep an eye on a specific experts’ work, asking for internal
studies to be passed on to him immediately upon publication. 
But the experts exert their most direct influence through the
medium of personal meetings, on the sidelines of lectures or
symposiums, at private interviews, or at study sessions of the
Politburo, during which experts are brought in to expound
on their specialised subjects.
In sum, the frequency of interaction and the number of re-
ports that these research centres are required to produce
have increased steadily since the start of the reforms and
opening up; but over the past decade they have proliferated
as the questions addressed have become more complex and
China’s leaders strive to rationalise their decision-making
procedures. The experts are more in demand. They are lis-
tened to more intently. Wen Jiabao himself declared that no
specialist would ever suffer for his opinions. 
It is noteworthy that the role and status of the centres special-
ising in international relations and those of the university cen-
tres are not mentioned here. We may also point out that while
the Development Research Centre of the State Council is
duly mentioned, few details are offered. While the experts’ in-
fluence is sought after, their place in the system remains am-
biguous: the report writer agrees to withhold his political rec-
ommendations unless explicitly asked to express them. How-
ever, for outside observers, given the frequent contacts be-
tween these experts and political leaders, any such recommen-
dations do take on an official colouring. By way of example, at
the time of the Asian financial crisis, when China had decided
not to devalue the Renminbi, a researcher had indicated in the
press his support for some flexibility in the Chinese currency.
The result was destabilisation of the Hong Kong markets, and
the situation was recovered only after the NRDC announced
its public support for the stability of the currency . . .
Yet, there is no doubt that Chinese leaders are, more than
ever before, willing to call in the experts on a variety of ques-
tions, and that the experts bring influence to bear -- directly
or indirectly, consciously or not -- on the decisions taken by
Chinese politicial leaders. The last word belongs to Ma: 
“At the start of the reforms, it was the economists who
were fqvoured; following the 15th National Congress it
was the lawyers who were most sought after; but now
the moment has come for the sociologists.” •
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Relations between France and China: 
the Break . . . with Germany?
Compiled and commented by Mathieu Duchâtel, based on:
• Luo Shaolan, “Sarkozy’s visit to China, a mission to set the tone for France-China relations.” Yazhou shibao zaixian
(atchinese.com), 26 November 2007.
• Luo Shaolan, “China’s relations with Germany: are they cooling off?” Yazhou shibao zaixian (atchinese.com), 
26 November 2007.
• Pan Xiaoshou, “Allowing Sarkozy to touch the Terracotta army: what did it mean?” Yazhou shibao zaixian (atchinese.com), 
27 November 2007.
LPresident Sarkozy was welcomed to China as no for-eign head of state has been welcomed since Presi-dent Clinton in 1998: nearly 20 billion euros’ worth
of contracts, a lavish dinner with Hu Jintao (French haute
cuisine rather than the customary Chinese specialities), and
permission to touch the precious soldiers of Emperor Qin
Shihuang’s Terracotta Army in Xian. Pan Xiaoshou writes
that Beijing’s evident intention was to soften him up (keyi
taohao). Back in 1998, Beijing needed a substantial im-
provement in its relations with Washington. Today, now that
China’s international standing has considerably improved
and its relations with France are far from being in crisis, why
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repose sur 2 axes
L’économie : pour présenter les évolutions de la conjoncture chinoise
et fournir toutes les informations afin de mieux anticiper les transfor-
mations qui s’annoncent. 
La culture : pour éclairer le dialogue avec les Chinois, donner envie
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Le magazine offre une synthèse des faits et des perspectives économi-
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miques, de reportages, d’interviews exclusifs et de témoignages.. 
are the leaders in Beijing laying on such a fine reception for
President Sarkozy?
First of all, the two countries’ interests really are complemen-
tary. Paris needs big contracts to keep big business interests
firmly behind the government, to improve France’s trade bal-
ance and to reduce the public deficit. France wishes to main-
tain economic cooperation and trade exchanges as the driv-
ing force behind its relations with China, while keeping its
approach constructive and pragmatic and seeking to win Bei-
jing’s cooperation over issues it considers important, such as
the fight against global warming. Beijing, for its part, needs
an ally within the European Union to defend Chinese inter-
ests there, with a particular view to lifting the embargo on
arms sales at some future date. Above all, China is always
avid for technology transfers, to rebuild its industrial base
and, in the longer term, to become a technological power in
its own right, capable of rivalling the West, or at least of
being less dependent upon it. From this point of view,
Sarkozy’s reputed Atlanticism has no effect on Franco-Chi-
nese relations. Between Paris and Beijing, the honeymoon
continues.
But the importance that China attaches to France may be
explained by a new factor: the change of attitude in Berlin,
where the government has decided to take a harder line to-
wards Beijing. As a consequence, according to Pan, China
has found it essential to compensate for the cooling down of
its relations with Germany by strengthening its friendship
with France. So China brought its usual strategy back into
play: divide and rule. Here Beijing perceives a double ad-
vantage. Firstly, it can secure for China a provider of tech-
nology: this at a time when the US, Japan, and Germany
are adopting a cautious approach to the usefulness of trans-
ferring technology to a state whose strategic intentions are
still opaque. Secondly, it can attempt to maintain the policy
of “using Europe to counter the US” (la’ou zhimei), or, at
the very least, to prevent a Western common front in support
of democracy and human rights. From this perspective,
France was the best prospect.
Paris had chosen its moment. In Germany, the Christian
Democrats (CDU) were in the process of reshaping their
Asia policy: Paris then opted to go it alone on the China
front, without seeking any joint stance with Berlin. On 26
October, Chancellor Angela Merkel unveiled the new Asia
policy as set out by the CDU in an independent report. (3)
The policy includes some significant adjustments, but does
not challenge the basic necessity for a close partnership with
China. The CDU judges that, in the past, Berlin relied too
heavily on Beijing to conduct its Asia policy, and that it is
time for German strategy to be realigned so as to take full
account of the democratic states in the region, such as
Japan, South Korea, and India. The CDU considers that
Berlin, blinded by the economic and commercial opportuni-
ties offered by the emergence of China, attached insufficient
importance to the serious challenge it poses to the environ-
ment, to defending the model of liberal democracy across
the world, or to respecting the market economy rules that
ought to govern the development of the new Asian power.
The policy change was reflected in actions: in Berlin, on 23
September, Chancellor Merkel received the Dalai Lama,
which threw Chinese leaders into a fury. Luo Shaolan as-
sesses the CDU’s report as the reintroduction of ideology
into German foreign policy. This wave of disapproval for
China was not limited to the German federal authorities: it
extended equally across society in this most populous of Eu-
ropean countries. At the end of August, the weekly Der
Spiegel published a special report condemning China for or-
chestrating a wide-ranging campaign of technological espi-
onage; (4) the report provoked a serious debate, which dam-
aged China’s reputation and brought open protests from
Germany’s Chinese community. Luo writes that the wind
has changed and the era of harmonious relations passed
with the departure of Chancellor Schroeder. Some ob-
servers had foreseen a similar development in France, with
a new President elected on a programme of breaking with
the past, an avowed Atlanticist sensitive to the theme of an
ethical foreign policy -- but it was not to be. At a time when
the European Union invests great hopes in its relationship
with China, the rift in the Franco-German partnership does
not presage much success in forging a common foreign pol-
icy in this part of the world. •
• Translated by Philip Liddell
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3. Asia as a strategic challenge and opportunity for Germany and Europe. See also the
analysis by Andreas Martin Fulda, “Germany’s Ruling Party in Search for a Strategic An-
swer to Asia’s Rise. New symbolism, some substantive change, much continuity,” Com-
mentary, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham. 
4. “Die Gelben Spione,” Der Spiegel, n° 35, 27 August 2007.
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Glossary
guojia xingzheng xueyuan 國家行政學院
keyi taohao 刻意討好
la’ou zhimei 拉歐制美
xibu kaifa 西部開發
